Abstract
field. Institutionalisation is understood here as formulated by Ji Zhe, taking inspiration from Giddens:
An "institution" could be conceived of as the general manner of the reproduction of rules and resources. If an organization is reconfigured by the encompassing external institutional arrangement, so that its structure and its rules about the reproduction and distribution of resources tend to be identical with its institutional environment, then it can be seen as an
'institutionalized' organization.
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On the one hand, the rejection of revolutionary iconoclasm and radicalism, and the policy of reform and opening up, has led to a greater tolerance toward religion; and an increasingly prominent discourse on the positive contributions of religion to philanthropy and social morality has even led to an exploration of ways of positively encouraging the development of religion. On the other hand, the Leninist model of state control of religious institutions has been retained and even reinforced as the state has expanded and modernised its bureaucracy. This tendency has been spurred by fears of political challenges and separatism emanating from an exploding popular religiosity -as in the case of Falun Gong 12 -and foreign links to religious communities, as in the case of Tibetans and Uyghurs. The tension between these two tendencies could only be resolved through strengthening religious orthodoxy, at the level of both discourse and institutions, so that religion could play its assigned role as an adjunct to social development, while also warding off political and separatist threats. The post-Mao religious institutionalisation, however, has not been a purely top-down enterprise as it had been in the 1950s; it is a project in which religious leaders, government officials, and scholars have invested themselves, combining different discursive regimes and forming a hybrid religio-bureaucratic institution. At the same time, the narrowness of the legitimate category of religion has reinforced the de-institutionalisation of other forms of religiosity, which have been forced to exist as dispersed networks or as underground organisations, and/or to seek institutionalisation under other categories such as health, tourism, or heritage, leading them to become partly or fully assimilated into the secular logics of those categories. In the past few years, state religious authorities have recognised the existence of such phenomena and become more open to a potential broadening of the category of religion. But the logic of state-led religious institutionalisation implies that such a broadening does not lead to a "freeing up" of the religious sphere along the Western model of church-state separation, but rather to the difficulty of expanding institutional management over an ever-growing religious domain.
The patriotic religious associations created under the CCP's guidance in the 1950s
were, for all five religions concerned, entirely new institutional formations. Never in history had China's Buddhists, Daoists, or Muslims been united in a China-wide organisation (there had been many attempts in the Republican period , but most of these had failed). 13 The multifarious Protestant sects and denominations were forced to merge into a single unit, cut off from overseas churches and missionary societies. And the Catholic association took orders from Zhongnanhai instead of the Vatican. Even within these five religions, the boundaries of legitimate religiosity were clearly drawn, excluding "feudal superstition" (especially in the cases of Buddhism and Daoism), links with "imperialist powers" (especially in the cases of Protestantism and Catholicism), and all groups that refused to submit to the authority of the patriotic associations (again especially in the cases of the Christian churches, as well as a portion of the Tibetan Buddhist clergy).
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The Cultural Revolution had seen all the socialist religious institutions abolished, from the United Front Department to the Religious Affairs Bureau and the Associations, as religion became a direct target to be eliminated. In the period of "reform and opening up" from 1979 onwards, this system was re-instated, but in a radically different context.
Even when the state stepped back to leave more space for religious activity, there were no strong indigenous religious institutions to occupy that space -in sharp contrast to the Orthodox and Catholic churches that quickly reinvested the religious field in post- Revolution. But it was these associations that were called on to organise China's resurgent religiosity, and that needed to be strengthened and further institutionalised.
The state attempted to shift from ideological dogmatism to the political co-optation of religious leaders, the bureaucratic management of religious communities, and the harnessing of religious resources to the goals of economic development and social harmony.
The state-led institutionalisation of Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and
Protestantism has created a relatively homogenous institutional structure for these five traditions, a hybrid of the secular socialist work unit (danwei) and traditional forms of clerical organisation, which has become constitutive of the religious habitus of the leaders of these communities. 15 The danwei is the modular system of nested units under which, in socialist China, all units of production and administration were nationalised and organised, and to which all workers were assigned for life, providing not only work but constitutive of the institutional order. In order to understand this process of institutionalisation, we need to consider the discursive networks in which the boundaries and forms of religion as a distinctive institution are defined, and the regulations that aim to translate the discourse into reality, and then consider the specific structure of the official bodies that create and reproduce these institutional forms. While I discuss discourses and institutions separately for ease of presentation, we should bear in mind that the two are in fact mutually constitutive.
The discursive network on religion
Each political system has its own regime of producing a discourse on legitimate forms of religion. This discourse not only assigns ideas, practices, and groups into a category of religion, with distinct rights, restrictions, and positions within the range of functionally differentiated social institutions in a given society, but also contributes to shaping the internal structure and norms of the religious groups themselves. in the Peoples' Republic of China should be seen in the context of the broader economy of discourse production and circulation between various official and unofficial actors, including Party leaders and organs, government departments, academic institutions, religious leaders and followers, and the media. We also need to bear in mind how, within this economy, a whole set of categories has evolved, often in opposition to each other, each of which has been used to label phenomena related to what, in anthropological terms, may broadly be considered as pertaining to the religious domain. These categories include "religion" zongjiao, of course, but also mixin (superstition), fandong huidaomen (reactionary secret society), and xiejiao (evil cult); minjian xinyang (popular faith) as well as wenhua (culture) and wenwu (cultural relic), fei wuzhi wenhua yichan (intangible cultural heritage), minsu (folk customs), minzu fengqing (exotic ethnic customs), and anything that can be categorised as a "tourist resource"; as well as "nourishing life," "qigong," "martial arts," "Chinese medicine," "sports," and "science"; and even "philanthropy," "National Members of the discursive network on religion, as officials, scholars, or staterecognised religious leaders, are expected to speak within the framework of broader Party policy. As such, their pronouncements carry a certain degree of authority and contribute to official discourse on religion. On the other hand, each has his own interests, allegiances, and integration into other discursive networks, so that there is a clear difference in the perspectives of the discursive actors. As Ryan Dunch has aptly formulated, a given policy pronouncement "functions as both code and cover: code for a set of officially sanctioned expectations, and cover for a broad range of intellectual and theological agendas invoking it as legitimation." 19 Party policy thus creates a common discursive framework that is invested and reproduced by actors with different interests and loyalties. The primary allegiance of religious affairs officials is to the governmentbut within the government they often see themselves (or are seen) as defenders of religious interests, or as promoters of a "proper" form of religion. Religious leaders toe the Party line in order to protect the interests of their communities, and also to reinforce their authority within the community. Scholars typically have a more liberal attitude than the government, but also need to establish and protect the legitimacy of their field of study, and they use academic norms of distance and objectivity to balance their sympathies with the religions they study. The best known case is the "cultural Christians," academics and intellectuals who do not explicitly profess belief in Christianity but take a Christian standpoint to engage in a critique of China's moral and social problems. 20 Another example is a network of scholars claiming the label of "New Daoism" xin daojia, who argue that Daoism should develop a new ideology for the twenty-first century based on environmentalism, gender equality, and traditional culture.
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We may also cite the widespread influence among academics and intellectuals of reformist Buddhism through the writings and initiatives of clerics such as Hsing Yun or
Jinghui. 22 It is in this context of multiple allegiances and complex motives that discourse on religion is generated through various publications and journals, and through meetings and conferences that might include one or several categories of discursive actor. The document stated that in socialist China, now that class exploitation had been successfully eradicated, "the class root of the existence of religion was virtually lost." But since peoples' consciousness lags behind changes in social structure, old ways of thinking will continue to persist, people will still need religion at times of disaster and misfortune, and religion will not disappear until the long stage of socialism is completed and communism is realised. crackdown on "spiritual pollution" targeted those activities: reactionary secret societies (huidaomen) and "spirit-mediums and witches" (shenhan wupo) were to be prevented from returning to activity, while practitioners of superstitious professions such as divination, physiognomy, numerology, and fengshui were to be re-educated to find another profession to make a living; if they persisted, they were to be disbanded. 
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